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JEROLDENE BAYLES, nka 
JEROLDENE BAILEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RANDEE BAYLES, 
Defendant/Appellee/ : 
Respondent. 
Case III 980347 CI A 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Th i s C ::H :;i i: t - i pu i sihint tu ikuiH u oi the i h 
Rules of Appellate Procedure because the Appellate Court granted 
Appellant - M^f - ^i • - Permission i ) Appeal from an Interim y 
'*"
 (le l
 [ ] 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellant appeals from .m 
t:_a M1T-+- denied motion to dismiss a petition to modify a 
decree - :ivcrce, seating that Appellee may brinq -i claim that 
fraud occurred oft |ojii*-»nt n| i i I i -MM O art jmi ill i |jetil, ion 
to modify. 
-- issues raised are: 
or secreting of 
assets was raised in the divorce action, and whether the issue was 
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waived in the Stipulation, thereby precluding the trial court from 
hearing evidence on that issue (res judicata)[R.129]; and 
Whether an action in fraud or secreting of assets may be heard 
in a petition to modify a decree of divorce. [R. 129, 130] 
A. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In this case the Court is presented with a question of law 
regarding whether the Appellee may file a Petition to Modify a 
Divorce Decree based on an allegation of fraud or the secreting of 
assets. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Levva, 951 P.2d 738, 739-742 (Utah 1997). The issue of whether the 
question of fraud was already raised or whether it was waived by 
the Stipulation is a question of fact which the court reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quoting Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 
1992)). The trial court's decision on a question of fact is 
entitled to a presumption of validity (Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 
123, 124 (Utah App. 1987)). 
B. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
It is unclear what issues Appellant intended to appeal. 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 97] raises only the issue of 
whether Plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery requests 
regarding financial records constitutes a basis for a Petition to 
Modify. The motion then states that the issues raised in the 
Memorandum [R. 99] are incorporated as additional reasons to 
dismiss the Petition. The issues raised in the Memorandum are: 
2 
A. Did the Appellee by entering into a stipulation waive 
the issue of fraud or secreting of assets? [R.99, Introduction] 
B. Is the property settlement modifiable? [R.100, 101] 
C. Has the Appellee failed to show a substantial change 
of circumstances? [R. 101] 
D. Can a party's failure to provide documents be a 
consideration as to change of circumstances in a Petition to 
Modify? [R. 103] 
The trial court made its own interpretation of the issue and 
in its ruling [R. 129] focused only on the issue of whether the 
allegation of fraud by secreting of assets was waived in the 
stipulation that preceded entry of the decree. [R.129-130] 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
A. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 530-3-5(3); 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
B. RULE 6-404(1): 
Modification of divorce decrees. 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced 
by the filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce 
action . . . " 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Randee Bayles (hereinafter "Randee" and Jeroldene 
Bayles, now known as Jeroldene Bailey (hereinafter "Jeroldene), 
were married on March 13, 1971. During a substantial portion of 
their married life, the parties engaged in a drilling exploration 
business, namely "Bayles Exploration". Shortly after the parties 
were married, Jeroldene became the bookkeeper and maintained the 
various records of the business. The parties became estranged, 
which resulted in the filing of a divorce complaint, dated January 
27, 1997. 
A hearing on an Order to Show Cause was held on February 6, 
1997, in which the trial court awarded the home and business 
property, which included the office of Bayles Exploration, to 
Randee. As Randee began reviewing the business records in an 
attempt to take over the financial management of the business and 
file tax returns, he became aware of certain irregularities in the 
business transactions, which included payment of all marital debts 
out of corporate accounts, a practice which had not occurred until 
the months just prior to the filing of the divorce. He observed 
the outlay of double utility payments and car payments, apparently 
done by Jeroldene in anticipation of being awarded the home and 
other property. 
At this time, Randee began requesting missing business 
records. A letter dated May 7, 1997 [R. 105, 106], was sent to 
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Douglas Terry, then counsel for Jeroldene, outlining some of the 
difficulties in the case. [R. 105,106] Randee had been able to 
establish as of the date of the writing of the letter, 
irregularities which are set forth on the second page of the 
letter. Randee further stated that "at the current time we do not 
have all of the necessary information with regard to necessary 
adjustments, however, some of the noteworthy items are. . ." 
Prior to a hearing of the matter, the parties entered into 
negotiations in which the various aspects then known to Randee were 
discussed and the parties ultimately entered into a stipulation. 
The corporate records of Bayles Exploration had still not been 
transferred by Jeroldene even though numerous requests were made 
through counsel and directly by Randee. [R. 84, 86] [R. 89-94] 
Specific items which were known by Randee to be problematic at the 
time of the divorce are set forth verbatim in the Stipulation [R. 
45, 46 (paragraph 17)], the Findings of Fact [R. 53,54 (paragraph 
17)] and the Decree [R. 61,62 (paragraph 17)]. 
The parties stipulated [R. 46 (paragraph 19) that Jeroldene 
would provide the records of the corporation, which provision of 
the stipulation was adopted in the Findings of Fact [R.54 
(paragraph 19)] and the Decree [R.62 (paragraph 19)]. 
At the time of the proceeding before the trial court, none of 
the information had been turned over to Randee. Subsequent to the 
entry of the Decree, Randee discovered that numerous checks had 
been drawn and/or signed by Jeroldene, which Jeroldene had not 
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divulged, nor had these funds been considered in the divorce 
proceeding. 
As of the date of this writing, the corporate records have 
still not been turned over to Randee. Randee obtained banking 
records and photo copies of checks which indicated that various 
business checks had been forged. [R.91 (paragraph 11)]. Based upon 
this information Randee filed a Petition to Modify asking that the 
court consider that there were substantial funds which were not 
considered in the original divorce action. 
The Appellant requested that the court dismiss the Petition to 
Modify and contends that the matter of fraud was already 
adjudicated. The District Court denied the motion on June 16, 
1998, from which this appeal was taken. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellee adopts the Course of Proceedings as outlined in the 
Appellant's brief and believes that the dates and documents as set 
forth are accurate. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
No evidentiary hearing has been held nor any evidence taken to 
determine whether the Petition to Modify has merit. No findings 
have been made with regard to any of the allegations of Randee, the 
Appellee. The Petition was verified and supported by affidavits. 
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss the proceedings were stayed 
pending outcome of the appeal on the interlocutory order. 
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D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Divorce Complaint was filed in this matter on January 27, 
1997, and Defendant's verified Answer and Counterclaim were filed 
on February 3, 1997. A hearing was held on reciprocal Orders to 
Show Cause on February 6, 1997. At the time of the hearing Randee 
requested that he be allowed to remain in the home as the office 
for the business was in the marital residence and this was the 
repository of the business records. [R. 18 (paragraphs 4, 5)] 
Randee was granted temporary possession of the home and discovered 
that the business ledgers and records had been removed. 
Randee began requesting the records for the purpose of 
carrying on the ongoing operations of the business and preparing 
taxes. Jeroldene never complied with those requests. (See 
Affidavit in Support of Motion in Re Contempt R. 39f paragraph 15) 
Jeroldene changed counsel and Douglas Terry entered his 
appearance by filing a Motion to Bifurcate on May 1, 1997. It was 
anticipated that the court would take evidence with regard to 
granting the divorce and hold all property issues for a later time. 
The parties then entered into discussions to resolve the property 
issues; Mr. Terry then expressed his desire to resolve all of the 
issues at one time rather than making two trips from St. George to 
Monticello. At this time Randee had been in possession of the 
marital residence and had recognized that there were personal and 
business items and records which were missing. 
Randee discovered that various personal bills had recently 
been paid from corporate accounts, which had not been the business 
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practice. These items were addressed in the letter of May 7 
[R.105]. It was clear, however, that Randee had additional 
concerns and did not have the ability to resolve them because he 
did not have the business records. At no place in the letter does 
he mention forgery nor did he express the amount of $17,000 which 
he believes was removed by Jeroldene from the business assets by 
way of forgery. There is an indication that Jeroldene made had 
kept all her income and accepted substantial income from the 
company, yet paid all of the marital bills from the Bayles 
Exploration. The letter further states that the lack of having the 
necessary documentation has caused Mr. Bayles to be unable to make 
appropriate decisions with regard to the vitality of the business 
or necessary adjustments to be made in the settlement, wherein the 
letter states: 
"We have made several requests that Jeroldene turn over 
the business records but have failed to receive these 
documents and so have drafted discovery to force the 
issue. I don't believe Jeroldene is entitled to retain 
the original business records and we may bring this 
before the court. At the current time we do not have all 
the necessary information with regard to the necessary 
adjustments, however, some of the noteworthy items are: 
$3000 cash kept in the safe in the home 
double payments on the car 
double utility payments 
frozen beef worth approximately $750 which 
Jeroldene took 
telephone charges for February, March and 
April charged to Randee•s card 
credit card charges involving personal items 
which were paid from business funds 
cost of preparation of tax returns 
liability for corporate taxes for 1996" 
The only items known to Randee were the items set forth in the 
letter and appear verbatim in the Stipulation [R.45], Findings 
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[R.53] and Decree [R.61], wherein it states that "Defendant waives 
any claims with respect to those items listed in Defendant's 
attorney letter dated May 7, 1991, to-wit; . . . " (Emphasis added). 
In the Stipulation [R.46], Findings of Fact [R.54] and the 
Decree [R.62], the court found that it was reasonable and the court 
ordered that the business records be turned over to Randee. Randee 
filed a subpoena to obtain banking records on July 22, 1997, for 
the purpose of trying to determine the status of Bayles 
Exploration. Based upon the obtention of some records, he was able 
to discover that additional funds not contemplated in the letter, 
Stipulation, Findings or Decree had been fraudulently removed from 
the business through Jeroldene's forgery. The first allegation 
regarding these funds was set forth in the Petition for 
Modification filed on November 19, 1997 [R.76 - 78] and Affidavit 
of Defendant [R.89-94]. 
No testimony or evidence has ever been given with regard to 
the merits of Randee*s Petition to Modify. Before the action was 
set for hearing Jeroldene filed a motion for an interlocutory 
appeal contesting the court's determination that Randee could file 
a petition to modify a divorce decree, wherein he alleged that 
there had been fraud in the original divorce proceeding, with the 
opposing party secreting assets. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal comes before the Court on a narrow issue. The 
district court determined that Randee's Petition to Modify alleging 
fraud or the secreting of assets was appropriately brought in a 
Petition to Modify. From that decision Jeroldene has appealed 
alleging that the court made an improper decision that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances. The district court did not 
make any finding or hear any evidence with regard to whether there 
was a substantial change of circumstances. There was no hearing, 
there is no evidence and there are no findings of fact from which 
this Court can determine whether an appropriate decision was made 
on the issue of change of circumstances. For this reason the 
claims of Jeroldene are premature and must be remanded to the 
district court with regard to whether Randee's allegations 
constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient for the 
property settlement in the decree to be modified. 
The issue of fraud, forgery or secreting of assets, if allowed 
to be shown at a proper hearing, is appropriately brought in a 
petition to modify. 
If the district court were to determine, after hearing 
evidence, that fraud, forgery or secreting of assets had occurred 
and had not been litigated in the original proceedings, this issue 
would not be res judicata and would be appropriate for the court to 
consider in a petition to modify the divorce decree. 
The failure of Jeroldene to provide appropriate corporate 
records in the face of numerous requests by Randee prevented Randee 
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from presenting his case fully or from having all of the 
information needed to allow him to pursue effectively his claims in 
the original divorce proceedings, and thus prevented Randee from 
receiving a determination on the merits with regard to the assets 
he believes were obtained by deception. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO A HEARING TO DETERMINE IF THE 
ISSUES RAISED IN HIS PETITION TO MODIFY HAVE ALREADY BEEN 
LITIGATED AND TO DETERMINE IF THERE HAS BEEN A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. FINDINGS ARE 
REQUIRED. 
The central theme of Jeroldene•s brief is that no substantial 
change of circumstances exists to justify a modification of the 
Decree of Divorce. Jeroldene correctly states the burden of Randee 
to establish a substantial change of circumstances before the trial 
court may make a determination to modify the property division of 
the Decree of Divorce. This argument ignores the procedural 
context in which this case is before the Court - Randee filed a 
petition to modify, Jeroldene moved to dismiss, the court denied 
the motion from which Jeroldene took this appeal. There was no 
hearing. The only evidence before the court are the verified 
pleadings. Based on these pleadings, Jeroldene would have the 
Court determine that Randee has not made a showing of a substantial 
change of circumstances. The case law allows the party moving for 
a petition to modify to have a hearing in which those issues may be 
heard. In Osmus v. Osmus, 198 P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1948), on a 
petition to modify support, the Court stated: 
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"It is a principle now firmly established in this 
jurisdiction that to entitle either party to modification 
of a decree of alimony or support money, that such a 
party plead and prove a change in circumstances such as 
to require, in fairness and equity, a change in the terms 
of the decree." (Emphasis added) 
Similarly, in the Utah case of Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 986 
(Utah 1953) the Court stated: 
"The legal principle controlling in this case is that a 
divorce decree may not be modified unless it is alleged, 
proved and the trial court finds that the circumstances 
upon which it is based have undergone a substantial 
change (Quoting Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P. 
76; Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 212, 198 P.2d 233) 
In our situation, the change of circumstances has only been 
alleged. The remaining legs of proof and findings await a hearing. 
In Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1985), the Court 
has stated: 
"The party seeking a modification of a decree must 
demonstrate to the Court below that a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the 
decree. Adams v. Adams, Utah 593 P.2d 147 (1979), Haslam 
v. Haslam, Utah 657 P.2d 757 (1982). While the court did 
not specifically state there was •substantial change of 
circumstances' it • s findings and supporting evidence are 
sufficient indica in this case that such a substantial 
change had taken place since the decree which was not 
within the original contemplation of the parties or the 
court at the time the original decree was rendered. CF 
Stettler v. Stettler P.2d , 18 Utah Advance Report 
15 (September 20, 1985). It is clear the court so found 
considering all of the relevant factors the record below 
supports a finding of substantial change of circumstances 
and the modification made by the trial court." (Emphasis 
added) 
In Thompson it is clear that the person seeking modification 
of the decree shall have an opportunity to demonstrate to the court 
below that a change of circumstances has occurred. This 
contemplates a hearing, evidence and findings. Jeroldene's 
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numerous references to what the trial court "found" are erroneous 
as there are no findings in this case because there was no hearing. 
Randee is not stating in this argument that the trial court erred 
in not making findings, but that the Jeroldene made an error in not 
allowing the process to proceed to a point where findings could be 
made. Had Jeroldene asked for a bifurcated hearing, allowed the 
Court to make a determination of whether there was a change of 
circumstances, then presumably there would be findings which this 
Court could review to determine whether Randee had shown an 
adequate and substantial change of circumstances, allowing him to 
proceed. Thompson speaks in terms of a "showing". Indeed, the 
same requirement was set forth in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 161 
P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) requiring a showing before the court 
could determine whether a substantial change of circumstances 
existed. Quoting Navlor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). 
It is further stated in Throckmorton at 124 that: 
"It is reversible error if the trial court fails to make 
findings on all material issues unless the facts and the 
record are 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment'". 
Quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P. 2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987 WQuoting Kinkella v. Bauqh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1983)). 
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse of discretion in 
setting alimony when the trial court failed to make findings on the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse. See Higley 
v. Hiqlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah, 1983) (Remanded since the trial 
court made no findings with regard to the receiving spouse's 
ability to work; Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Ut. Ct. App. 
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1987)(Trial court failed to adequately address the financial needs 
of the claimant's spouse making it necessary for the reviewing 
court to remand the issue for further findings) 
Jeroldene consistently speaks in terms of a failure to 
demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances, Randee concedes 
that no such demonstration was ever made because a hearing was not 
held. If Randee's Petition to Modify, which was verified, and the 
accompanying affidavits to the Order to Show Cause and Petition, 
make out a prima facia case, then Randee should have been allowed 
to proceed with evidence to show a substantial change of 
circumstances. The filing of the appeal in this action has 
procedurally blocked that process. There is no decision of the 
trial court determining whether there was a substantial change of 
circumstances that this Court can review. 
POINT 2: THE ISSUE OF FRAUD (FORGERY OR SECRETING OF ASSETS) IS 
APPROPRIATE BROUGHT IN A PETITION TO MODIFY. 
In the case of Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah 1952) a 
husband, shortly before obtaining a divorce, had induced the wife 
to quit-claim to him her interest in property held by them as joint 
tenants. Because of the transfer, the wife did not present fully 
the property issues to the court when a decree of divorce was 
obtained. The Court in Glover was faced with a determination of 
what constituted extrinsic fraud. The Court settled on a 
definition which included a statement that extrinsic fraud exists 
where a party was prevented from presenting his case or was induced 
not to present it by the actions of the other party so that there 
was no adversary trial or decision of the issue. The Court 
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determining that relief is granted on the theory that such fraud 
has prevented the unsuccessful party from fully presenting his case 
and hence, that there had never been a real contest before the 
court on the subject matter. Quoting Glover at 300: 
"We are simply affording plaintiff an opportunity to 
invoke the powers of a court of general jurisdiction to 
include within a prior divorce decree the property rights 
of the parties normally included therein but omitted in 
this case because of the alleged fraud of the defendant." 
Randee has alleged in this case that he sought on numerous 
occasions to obtain the financial information on the company which 
the parties had jointly operated. That information was never 
provided by Jeroldene. It wasn't until after the decree was 
entered that Randee became aware that substantial assets of the 
corporation had been withdrawn by forgery or theft and that these 
assets are alleged to not have been within the contemplation of the 
court when the property settlement was made. The secreting of 
these assets, the failure to put them "on the table" in the 
property settlement and the withholding of the financial 
information constitutes a fraud upon Randee and prevented him from 
fully litigating the property issues before the court. If it can 
be shown that Jeroldene actually did remove and convert the funds 
by fraud or forgery, those funds would be subject to consideration 
of the trial court in the allocation of marital property rights of 
the parties in the divorce. The ability to make this proof were 
omitted because of the actions of the Jeroldene. The holding of 
the Court in Glover at 300 was that this matter may be adjudicated 
under the general jurisdiction of the district court initiated by: 
16 
"a pleading entitled a petition to show cause why the 
prior divorce decree should not be modified so as to 
include within it the property rights of the parties 
omitted therefrom because of extrinsic fraud". 
POINT 3: THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MAKE SUBSEQUENT 
CHANGES TO DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY. 
It is clear pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3) that 
the district courts of the State of Utah have continuing 
jurisdiction to 
"make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of 
the children and their support, maintenance, health and 
dental care and for distribution of the property and 
obligations or debts as is reasonable and necessary." 
U.C.A. §30-3-5(3) 
Case law has interpreted the statute: 
"A party seeking modification of a divorce decree must 
demonstrate that • a substantial change of circumstances 
has occurred since the entry of the decree*, Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) and 'a trial 
court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for . . . distribution of the 
property . . . as is reasonable and necessary."1 Toone 
v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah App. 1998). 
Statute and case law allows a court to reconsider property 
distributions if not previously adjudicated and if a substantial 
change of circumstances is shown. See Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 
707, 710 (Utah 1985); McCrarv v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 
1979); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App. 
1988). 
POINT 4: THE ISSUE OF FRAUD, FORGERY OR SECRETING OF ASSETS WAS 
NOT LITIGATED IN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. 
It is clear that the district court has the jurisdiction to 
hear petitions to modify divorce decrees, but will not change a 
decree if the parties had previously litigated the issues. The 
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courts have so held in Throckmorton at 121 and 123, where the Court 
stated: 
"The moving party must establish a substantial change or 
circumstances 'which was not within the original 
contemplation of the parties or the court at the time the 
original decree was ordered'". Quoting Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) and stated 
similarly in Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah App. 
1998) wherein the court stated that a decree of divorce 
shall not be modified and the matters previously 
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally 
attacked in the face of the doctrine of res judicata." 
The issue of whether Jeroldene fraudulently secreted assets 
from the business was not reviewed in the initial proceeding. 
Jeroldene has appealed the ruling of the court denying her motion. 
Any findings of the court are to be found in the ruling on the 
Motion to Dismiss. [R. 129] The court makes its ruling on a fairly 
narrow issue where it states: 
"Jeroldene has moved the court to dismiss the petition 
for modification . . . on the grounds that the issue 
raised by Randee were expressly waived in the stipulation 
that proceeded entry of the divorce decree." 
The court then ruled, quoting Glover, that it is appropriate for a 
party to raise the issue of fraud in a petition to modify and 
denied the motion to dismiss. Arguably, this could be said to be 
a finding by the court that the fraud issue was not expressly 
waived in the stipulation, and therefore was not considered by the 
court in the divorce hearing. Were the court to have made a 
determination that the fraud issue was raised in the original 
proceeding, or that the claims in the petition to modify were 
waived by the stipulation, the court could have made a ruling 
dismissing the petition. The court did not make such a ruling and 
18 
it can thereby be inferred that the court is finding that the 
issues raised by Randee in the petition were not expressly waived 
in the stipulation nor were they part of the proceedings in the 
original decree. 
Events leading to the May 13, 1997, hearing included the May 
7, 1997 letter, [R. 105], followed Jeroldene's filing of a petition 
to bifurcate the proceeding. The court placed the matter on the 
calendar on the 13th day of May, 1997, for the purpose of hearing 
whether a divorce should be granted, not for hearing the property 
issues. The May 7, 1997, letter raised the issue that perhaps a 
settlement could be reached and when Mr. Terry appeared on that 
day, it was his desire to have the whole matter heard so that he 
would not have to make a return trip. The effect of this was that 
discovery, which had already been drafted by Randee's counsel, was 
never filed. However, Randee had made numerous informal requests 
for discovery, including the request in the May 7 letter. Both Ms. 
Riley and Mr. Terry had agreed to provide the material. The 
matters which were known to Randee were set forth. This list of 
items was carried forward into the Stipulation, Findings and 
Decree. There is no reference to any other assets which were known 
to Randee at the time. The lists within the Stipulation, Findings 
and Decree are specific wherein it states that: 
"Defendant waives any claims against Plaintiff with 
respect to those items listed . . . to-wit:" [R.45,53,61] 
The list is specific and contains no reference to the $17,000 or to 
fraud, forgery and other assets which may have been secreted by 
Jeroldene. These issues were not contemplated by the parties or 
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the court at the time of the original divorce hearing. Randee 
initiated investigation in July to attempt to uncover the financial 
circumstances of his business. This being an additional indication 
that he didn't have sufficient documentation or knowledge at the 
time of the hearing to even raise the issue. In any event, these 
issues should be heard by the lower court, not only for a 
determination of whether they were raised in the lower court or had 
the ability to be, but also from the standpoint of whether or not 
they would constitute a change of circumstances. 
POINT 5: THE REFUSAL OF JEROLDENE TO PROVIDE THE REQUESTED 
DOCUMENTATION PLACED RANDEE IN A POSITION OF NOT HAVING 
THE ABILITY TO FULLY LITIGATE THE ISSUES OR TO HAVE THE 
ISSUES DETERMINED ON THEIR MERITS. 
Two cases are on point to regard with the failure of a party 
to provide needed documents or to allow one of the parties to have 
an adequate opportunity of presenting their case in full. In the 
case of Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah, 
1980) a party had made a written demand for the production of 
various divorce records. Defense counsel agrees that he had agreed 
to produce the necessary documents without the necessity of 
subpoena, but failed to do so at trial. Defense counsel also 
admitted the existence of the documents which concerned the income 
of the plaintiff. The court found that since the documents dealt 
directly with an issue which the plaintiff was trying to establish, 
the conduct of withholding the documents from the defendant was 
unjustified and resulted in prejudicial error to the plaintiff in 
that she was unable to pursue effectively her claim for 
modification of alimony. The case was remanded to allow the 
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plaintiff a hearing on her claims for additional alimony. 
Similarly, in the case of Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 
1952), one party's obtention of a deed to marital property, and 
then not including that property as part of the marital estate was 
deemed by the court to be extrinsic fraud and it was said: 
"When its effect is to prevent the unsuccessful party 
from having a trial or from presenting his case fully, as 
for instance keeping him away from the court by false 
promise, or compromise, or purposefully keeping him in 
ignorance of the pendency of the action" 
then, the court determined, that the party could bring a petition 
to modify including those property rights which had been ignored or 
not allowed to proceed because of the action of the other party. 
In our case this is exactly what has occurred. Randee has alleged 
in his Petition to Modify that substantial amounts of money were 
secreted by fraud or forgery and those items would have been part 
of the marital estate and should have been considered by the court 
and would have been had they been disclosed by Jeroldene. 
Randee requested personally and through counsel that the 
records be surrendered. Both attorneys Reilly and Terry agreed to 
provide them without the necessity of formal discovery, but never 
did. The court ordered that they be turned over; they were not. 
The failure to provide the records prevented Randee from effective 
access to the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
If there are any findings, they must be gleaned from the 
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss. From the court's ruling 
it must be determined that the court found that the issues raised 
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by Randee were not waived in the Stipulation that preceded the 
entry of the divorce decree, and thereby the court did not have 
these issues before it. The court further ruled that an issue 
brought before it claiming fraud in the original proceeding was 
specifically authorized in Glover. This being the case, this Court 
does not have to get to the issues raised by the Jeroldene wherein 
she alleges that Randee failed to meet his burden showing that 
there had been a substantial change of circumstances. The trial 
court simply did not reach these issues. There was no hearing, the 
lower court simply has not reviewed, on the merits, any of the 
allegations contained in Randee*s Petition to Modify the divorce 
decree. If the Court of Appeals upholds the district court's 
ruling, the lower court would simply set the matter for hearing, 
during which Randee would be required to put on his proof that a 
substantial change of circumstance had occurred which was not 
contemplated in the original divorce proceeding. Upon such a 
showing or non-showing, the court would be free to take the next 
step to either deny Randee•s Petition to Modify or to proceed to 
determine whether the property settlement should be modified. The 
Order of the District Judge should be upheld. 
DATED this '^%ay of November, 1998. 
CRAIG CU HALLS 
Attorney for Appellee 
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